

Sovereign Outlook 2026

Europe showing resilience but significant risks ahead



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
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


Scope's sovereign rating portfolio



- ➤ In 2025, of 38 publicly rated sovereigns, we upgraded three, downgraded two, revised the Outlook upwards for six and downward for seven.
- > The current portfolio has five sovereigns on a Negative Outlook (AT, FI, FR, SK, GE) and six on a Positive Outlook (CY, ES, GR, HR, IT, PT)






^{*}as of 24 November 2025. No rating Outlook currently assigned on Ukraine in selective default. Displayed are Outlooks on long-term issuer ratings in foreign currency. Source: Scope Ratings

Rating convergence since 2019




- > Upside pressure on previously lower rated sovereigns: GR, PT, IT, CY, ES, IE: political stability, growth momentum, ongoing fiscal consolidation
- > Downside pressure: AT, FI, FR, BE, US: sustained structural fiscal pressures, complicated governance, insufficient reform

EA sovereign ratings End-2019 vs Latest 2025



Non-EA sovereign ratings End-2019 vs Latest 2025



Source: Scope Ratings

Negative sovereign outlook for 2026



- > Geopolitical tensions will remain a key external risk for sovereign ratings in 2026
- > Increased political polarisation weakens long-term reform momentum, posing a challenge to countries facing significant structural fiscal pressures
- > The significant risks outweigh possible positive impacts from stronger growth and some pockets of fiscal resilience in the EU

Geopolitical tensions

United States: foreign policy enforcement through tariffs, sanctions and reallocating defence priorities

China: control of rare earth minerals gives leverage over global supply chains; increase in high-value goods production challenges established players

Russia: increased focus on hybrid warfare against European countries; evolution of Russia-Ukraine war key for European sovereigns

Political polarisation

Key elections: Hungary and US mid-terms in 2026; France, Spain, Poland, Italy in 2027

Political polarisation in Europe including growing public support for political extremes weighs on structural reform drive

Weakened US governance reduces predictability and stability of US policymaking; increased risk of policy missteps; Fed governance and mid-term elections key for US Outlook

Fiscal challenges

Europe: high spending pressure on defence, ageing and interest; high and/or rising public debt ratios; challenges implementing necessary structural reform

United States: government shutdowns likely in 2026; deteriorating public finances only partially offset by tariff revenues; constrained budgetary flexibility

China: high fiscal stimulus and spending pressures lead to a sharp increase in public debt; continued weakness in the real estate sector

Stronger growth

EU reform agenda:

deepening the single market, enhancing energy market integration, and structural reforms under NGEU could support growth

Al investments: adoption could support stronger productivity growth globally

Deregulation: the strong focus on deregulation in the US could accelerate similar reforms in other jurisdictions

Pockets of fiscal resilience

EU resilience: several European sovereigns continue to benefit from past reforms, leading to a sustained decline in public debt ratios; EU-based funding programmes can reduce funding costs of member states facing high yields in financial markets

Fiscal space: While facing significant structural pressures, some European economies still have significant fiscal space




1. Geopolitics – economic competition and military tensions

United States' shifting policy stance


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- > Reshaping international trade order with volatile policymaking regarding tariffs and international sanctions
- > Testing resilience of security commitment vis-à-vis Europe


Average effective tariff rate on US imports



USD reserve currency status



Defence commitments to allies



Source: Defence Manpower Data Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2025


Source: The Budget Lab at Yale


Source: IMF COFER


China dominates manufacturing production and moves up the value chain



- > Controlling entire value chains from inputs to manufacturing and exports
- > Moving up value chains through critical inputs and domestic innovations







Source: Eurostat, US Geological Survey


Source: ECA based on BCG and SIA study - Emerging resilience in the semiconductor supply chain, 2024


Source: IMF WEO, Scope Ratings


Russia-Ukraine: financial resources critical for war outcome



- > Baseline: war continues; EU to shoulder most financially, US mostly militarily; potential use of Russian assets for EUR 140bn reparation loan
- > Optimistic: ceasefire; probably requires China and India to moderate purchases of Russian fuels
- > Adverse: escalation; 'Ukraine fatigue' among EU-US (elections 2027-28), China's support for Russia continues







Source: International Energy Agency, Scope Ratings

Source: European parliament, Scope Ratings

Note: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment. RDNA 4 of February 2025. Source: World Bank, Scope Ratings




2. Politics – fragmentation and polarisation

Governance decisions and key elections out to 2030

SCOPE


- > 2026 and 2028 focus on US governance and elections while 2027 and 2029 focus is on Europe
- > French 2027 election likely the most decisive European political event until the end of the decade





EU: 2027 elections critical for integration agenda and EU's resilience




- > FR: will RN gain legislative majority and/or the presidency? 2027 governance: absolute, relative majority or 'cohabitation'? RN policy shift à la Meloni?
- > ES: parliamentary fragmentation, minority governments since 2016, inability to pass budget since 2023
- > DE: will the coalition hold until 2029? Will AfD and Die LINKE extend success to Western Germany and maintain their 1/3 blocking majority?















Source: German Federal Returning Officer, Politico Poll of Polls, Scope Ratings





- > FOMC decisions and perceived political influence critical; risk of unanchored inflation expectations and the return of fiscal dominance?
- > 2026 November mid-terms: will Democrats flip the House? Senate (35/100 seats contested: 22 R; 13 D) likely to stay Republican
- > 'BBB' deal raised debt ceiling by USD 5 trillion to USD 41.1 trillion, a level expected to be reached by end-2027






Source: Federal Reserve, Scope Ratings Note: CPI = Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers (U.S. City Average). Real policy rate as approximated by Federal Funds Effective Rate - CPI.

2026 mid-terms latest polls, % of seats ■ D uncontested+Safe Likely D ■ Toss Up Lean D Lean R Likely R ■ R uncontested+Safe 100% 47 185 20 20 26 41 167 House of Representatives Senate





Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S Congress, Scope Ratings forecasts




3. Macro, Fiscal, Markets

Lower EU internal barriers can raise growth amid tariff shock, CN competition




- > Uneven growth outlook, Germany expected to return to growth following debt brake reform
- > Draghi & Letta: completing EU Single Market, deepening CMU, co-ordination of energy markets could strengthen growth potential
- > China's rapid move towards becoming a leader in high-tech, high-value industries challenges growth potential of other economies

Europe – US growth outlook (2019 = 100)




Source: IMF, Scope Ratings

Ability to raise Europe's growth potential, Impact on EU GDP, pps



Source: IMF Working Paper, June 2025 - Lifting Binding Constraints on Growth in Europe, Scope Ratings

Impact of export competition from China on annual GDP growth: 2026-2029 average, pps




Source: Goldman Sachs, Scope Ratings


Manageable defence expenditure needs to appease President Trump and deter Russia...




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- > Revised 3.5% NATO target implies aggregate annual military expenditure increase of ~ EUR 300bn (~ 1.5% of GDP) by 2035
- > Competes with unavoidable market (interest payments) and politically sensitive (welfare) spending, adding to fiscal pressures










Source: European Commission - 2024 Ageing Report, Institute for Fiscal Studies, NATO, IMF, Scope Ratings Note: Defence spending as defined according to Eurostat (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland) and ONS (UK) accounting standards. Linear increase assumed until 2032.

...but divergent fiscal positions and perceived security threats drive national responses



> Germany to increase defence expenditure.; other member states constrained by limited fiscal space or perceived need; 3.5% target by 2035 (end of next US administration)




Source: IMF, Scope Ratings forecasts

Note: Euro-area (EA) members are shown in blue, non-EA EU members are shown in shaded-blue, rest of world is shown in red. Dot sizes reflect the projected debt-to-GDP ratios for 2030, in relative terms.


Sovereigns face budget pressures from rising interest payments



- > Sovereigns whose budget pressure from interest spending will be near or above long-term highs include US, HU, CN, FR, JP, FI
- > Longer average government debt maturities help to delay the impact of higher bond yields for some sovereigns







Average government debt maturity, Years

Source: Bloomberg, Scope Ratings


Source: IMF, Scope Ratings

Note: Post-2000 peak value for Türkiye amounted to 50.2%

Fiscal pressures and growth outlooks drive debt dynamics until 2030



- > Significant debt reduction expected in recently upgraded sovereigns (Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Spain)
- > Continuous fiscal pressures in Austria, Finland, UK, France, US, Belgium, China




Source: IMF, Scope Ratings forecasts Note: Shaded areas indicate non-EU countries.





- > Price-earnings ratios are near historical all-time highs; ~ 90% of US growth in 2025 driven by AI investments
- > Concentration within S&P 500 is at the highest level for more than a century, driven by the Magnificent 7 and AI-related expectations





Source: R.J. Shiller, S&P Global



4. Global tensions, EU resilience – scenarios

2030: significant uncertainty from potential political swings in Europe & US



- > European elections and US governance critical for shaping policy environment; French voters and US Supreme Court decisions decisive
- > Distinct possibility that Europe faces 'scenario 6' in mid 2027 but other outcomes also possible

Political drivers		US governance	
		Continues to weaken (Trump emboldened)	Remains broadly intact (Trump contained)
EU mainstream parties	Empowered & push reforms (Draghi & Letta)	EU renaissance Bold European reforms; ambitious EU budget (+ UA support); US volatility vs Europe as relative safe-haven	Improved outlook, lower uncertainty EU accelerates reforms but lingering complacency; US governance concerns ease
	Remain mostly complacent/ stuck	4. Status quo; high uncertainty (2025) Muddling through; credit broadly stable Continued volatility and uncertainty	3. Europe's relative decline continues (2024) Investors gain more confidence in US (& USD); (institutions withstand Trump shock)
	Weakened, lose to nationalists (RN)	6. Populist governance in EU & US Significant credit risk Reversal of EU integration: will institutional guardrails hold? Potential Russian escalation	5. Europe's relative decline accelerates European integration slows & EU loses further ground to US



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